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Jeff Dykes* and Otway B. Denny, Jr. **
I. LIABILITY INSURANCE
J JTGLIGENT Entrustment. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Under-
writers Inc. v. McManus' was a declaratory judgment action
. brought by Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters against
its insured concerning the company's duty to defend under a Texas home-
owner's policy. 2 The evidence showed that the insured, Harold McManus,
purchased a trail bike for his son, James. James allowed his friend, Craig
Woiley, to ride the trail bike. Wolley then collided with another bike rid-
den by Daniel Garcia. Garcia sued both Wolley and James McManus,
claiming that McManus had negligently entrusted the trail bike to Wolley.
The trial court held that Fidelity had no duty under the homeowner's
policy to defend a suit alleging negligent entrustment because the policy
excluded actions arising from the ownership, operation, and use of recrea-
tional motor vehicles.3 Although the jury found that the trail bike was a
recreational motor vehicle, the court of civil appeals held that the exclu-
sion clause did not apply because negligent entrustment is a separate and
distinct cause of action involving the permission to use and not the actual
use of the vehicle."4
* B.A., M.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-
bright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
"* B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Fulbright
& Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Laurence S. Kurth, Attorney at Law,
Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas, in the preparation of this Article.
1. 633 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1982).
2. The policy contained the standard language with respect to Fidelity's duty to
defend:
Coverage D-Personal Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property dam-
age, and the company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging such
bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable
under the terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
Id. at 788.
3. The policy stated: "Exclusions---coverage D shall not apply; 4. a. to the ownership,
maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of; (3) any recreational motor vehicle
owned by any insured, if the bodily injury or property damage occurs away from the resi-
dent premises." Id.
4. 615 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1981). The court of ap-
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The supreme court reversed, holding the exclusion applicable.5 The
court noted that the issue of whether negligent entrustment arises out of
ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a vehicle or results from per-
mission to use a vehicle had never been before the Texas Supreme Court,
although it had been vigorously litigated in foreign jurisdictions.6 These
jurisdictions are squarely divided into two opposing lines of authority re-
garding the insurer's duty to defend. 7
The first line of cases holds that under the basic homeowner's policy the
insurer is obligated to defend the insured against an allegation of negligent
entrustment. 8 The Kansas Supreme Court in Upland Mutual Insurance,
Inc. v. Noel9 found that the insurer has a duty to defend even though the
immediate cause of injury and death was the operation of a motor vehicle,
and the homeowner's policy had expressly excluded liability coverage for
the use of automobiles away from the premises. 10 In the words of the
Kansas court, the theory of negligent entrustment "is not directly related to
the ownership, maintenance, operation, use of the vehicle.""l
I Conversely, in a second line of cases, the majority of jurisdictions recog-
nizes negligent entrustment as a distinct and specific cause of action that is
derived from, or is related to, the more general concepts of ownership,
operation, and use of a vehicle. 12 The leading case advancing this view is
Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 13 In Cooter the Alabama
Supreme Court stated that an entrustee's negligent use is essential to the
maintenance of a negligent entrustment action.' 4 If, therefore, the instru-
mentality negligently used is expressly excluded from policy coverage, the
duty to defend does not arise. 15
peals also emphasized the broad language of the coverage clause and found that the exclu-
sion, by virtue of its limited language, was intended to be construed more narrowly. Id. at
880-81.
5. 633 S.W.2d at 789.
6. Id. at 788-89.
7. Id. at 789.
8. The court cited a number of cases reaching this result. 633 S.W.2d at 789 n.i.
9. 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737 (1974).
10. 519 P.2d at 741. The Upland policy stated: "[T]his policy does not apply. . . . to
the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading and unloading of. . . automobiles."
1d. at 739.
11. Id. at 741. Significantly, the court also stressed the broad policy language and the
narrow limitations of the exclusionary clause. See supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Kosies, 124 Ariz. 136, 602 P.2d 517
(1979) (automobile exclusion in homeowner's policy applies when the accident involved the
use or operation of an automobile); Gargano v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 So. 2d 220 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (cause of action of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to a minor
child arises from the ownership, operation, or use of the vehicle; motor vehicle exclusion in
policy thus applies); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Granden, 119 N.H. 394, 402 A.2d 174 (1979) (use of
the instrumentality is negligent act, not the entrustment).
13. 344 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1977).
14. Id. at 499. The court further noted that a logical extension of the Upland rationale
would permit recovery by the injured party without a showing of negligence or fault on the
entrustee's part. Id.
15. The court's focus was sharply drawn on the elements of the negligent entrustment
tort. Citing negligent use by the entrustee as an element of the tort, the court concluded that
negligent entrustment arose from the ownership or use of a motor vehicle. Id.
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After examining each of the two alternative lines of cases the Texas
Supreme Court chose to adopt the majority view. 16 The court held that in
order to recover under a negligent entrustment action the plaintiff must
prove: (1) entrustment by the owner or custodian; (2) an entrustee whom
the owner knew, or should have known, was reckless and incompetent;
and (3) negligent operation of the vehicle proximately causing damage to a
third party.' 7 The elements essential to recovery in a negligent entrust-
ment action, therefore, include not only the actual entrustment by the own-
er or custodian, but also the entrustee's negligent operation or use of the
vehicle. Thus, reasoning that liability arises from the negligent operation
or use of a vehicle, the supreme court held the homeowner's policy excu-
sion clause applicable.' 8
Gonzales v. American States Insurance Co. 19 was a declaratory judgment
action that American States Insurance Company filed against its insured,
Herby Gonzales. Gonzales had been sued by Perez who had suffered inju-
ries after his leg became entangled in an ice auger at a company where
Gonzales had previously installed a protective grate. Perez's petition al-
leged that Gonzales owned the ice auger. American States refused to de-
fend Gonzales on the grounds that its investigation had revealed that
Gonzales did not own the ice auger, and therefore, the events giving rise to
the suit came within the "completed operation hazard" exclusion in the
policy.20 Gonzales argued that the plaintiffs allegations in his petition de-
termined the insurer's duty to defend without reference to the truth or fal-
sity of such allegations.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of American States, but the
court of appeals reversed, finding that the carrier had a duty to defend.
2
'
The court developed a two-part rule for determining when an insurer must
defend an action. In situations in which an insurance company bases its
refusal to defend on grounds that the insured in not liable to the claimant,
the allegations in the claimant's petition control, and facts not stated in the
petition may not be used to controvert the allegations. 22 When the com-
pany delines to defend on grounds that the events giving rise to the suit are
outside the coverage of the insurance policy, however, facts extrinsic to the
plaintiffs petition may be used to determine whether a duty to defend
16. 633 S.W.2d at 790.
17. Id.; accord supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (Alabama Supreme Court
used same rationale in holding insurer has no duty to defend a negligent entrustment
action).
18. 633 S.W.2d at 790.
19. 628 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
20. The policy defined "completed operations hazard" as follows:
"[C]ompleted operations hazard" includes bodily injury and property damage
arising out of operations or reliance upon a representation or warranty made
at any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property dam-
age occurs after such operations have been completed or abandoned and oc-
curs away from premises owned by or rented to the named insured.
Id. at 185.
21. Id. at 187.
22. Id.
19831
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exists.23
Since the plaintiffs original petition in Gonzalez contained a general al-
legation that the equipment involved in the injury was owned by all of the
defendants, the court found the issue to be whether the insured was liable
to the claimant, rather than whether the suit involved events outside the
coverage of the policy.24 Under the two-part rule, therefore, even though
the evidence tended to show that Gonzales did not own the equipment in
question, this evidence could not be considered in order to defeat the in-
surer's duty to defend.25 The court thus held that American States was
obligated to defend the suit against Gonzales. 26
Construction of Policy Exemption Clauses. In Aetna Fire Underwriters In-
surance Co. v. Southwestern Engineering Co. 27 Southwestern filed suit on a
liability insurance policy to recover the costs of defense and settlement of
three property damage suits. Southwestern was a consulting engineering
firm that entered into a contract with the Fort Ben Telephone Company to
design facilities in Waller County. Fort Bend contracted with Sandidge
Construction Company to construct the facilities designed by Southwest-
ern. While digging a trench for a telephone cable, Sandidge personnel
struck an underground pipeline owned by Phillips Pipeline Company.
Phillips brought suit for damages against Sandidge and Southwestern.
Aetna refused to defend the damage suits, contending that the damages
asserted in the underlying suits arose out of engineering services South-
western had performed, and that the policy clearly excluded "engineering
services."' 28 Aetna argued that the locations of the underground pipelines
was one of the contractual obligations Southwestern had undertaken in its
contract with Fort Bend, and as such should be considered "engineering
services." Atena further contended that the term "engineering services" in
the exclusion was clearly unambiguous, so that Aetna was absolved of the
duty to defend Southwestern.
The court of appeals disagreed with Atena's position, however, and held
that the term "engineering services" was ambiguous. 29 The court, there-




26. Id. The court's holding, in effect, requires that the plaintiffs factual allegations
comprising his cause of action be accepted as true. Thus, to avoid its duty to defend, the
insurer must show that notwithstanding the truth of the plaintifi's factual allegations some
independant ground justifies its refusal to defend.
27. 626 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. The exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Policy issued by Aetna
stated the following:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of any professional services performed by or for the
named insured, including (1) the preparation or approval of maps, plans,
opinions, reports, surveys, designs or specifications and (2) supervisory, in-
spection or engineering services.
Id. at 101.
29. Id. Significantly, however, the court noted that the insurance policy did not define
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the act of locating underground pipelines was not included within the term
"engineering services" in the exclusionary clause.30 The court thus as-
sessed Aetna with the cost of the defense and settlement in all three suits.
3
'
Effect of Government Medical Benefits on Insurance Company Liability.
Government Employee Insurance Co. v. Vail32 involved a claim for benefits
due under the personal injury protection (PIP) endorsement on an auto-
mobile insurance policy. Daniel Vail, a minor, was injured while a pas-
senger in a car driven by Michael Gray. Vail received extensive medical
and hospital treatment at Brooke Army Hospital as part of the benefits to
which Vail's father was entitled as a retired member of the Air Force.
In a primary lawsuit against Michael Gray and others Vail's attorney
also represented the United States Government in its claim for recovery of
the medical and hospital costs it expended in Daniel Vail's treatment. The
parties settled the primary lawsuit for $40,000, with the Government Em-
ployees Insurance Company (GEICO) also contributing to the gross settle-
ment. The executed releases specifically excepted the claim for PIP
benefits that might be due the Vails because of the GEICO policy issued to
Vail's father. Additionally, the settlement required Vail to set aside escrow
in excess of $10,000 to reimburse the Government for the expenses in-
curred. GEICO contended that because the Government had paid for the
treatment, the plaintiff did not incur any medical expenses within the
meaning of the insurance policy in issue and, therefore, had no right to
recover.
33
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that Vail had incurred medical
expenses within the policy's provisions. 34 The critical issue in the dispute
was the interpretation of the word "incurred." The court noted that the
precise question had not come to the attention of an appellate court in
Texas, although both appellee and appellant presented several relevant
cases from federal and foreign jurisdictions. 35 The court chose to adopt
the term "engineering services." Thus, if Aetna had defined the term rather than relying on
extrinsic sources, the court's conclusion likely would have been different. Id.
30. Id. at 101-02. The court noted the well recognized rule that exceptions and rules of
limitation in an insurance policy must be strictly construed against an insurer. Id. at 101.
31. Id. at 102.
32. 623 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. The personal injury protection endorsement required the insurer to pay: "any
member of the insured's household who sustains bodily injury, caused by accident, in a
motor vehicle accident . . . for losses incurred by such injured person within three years of
the date of such accident for: (1) all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred for
services furnished . . . during the period of such injured person's disability." Id. at 171.
34. 1d. at 172.
35. Courts that have decided the issue have reached conflicting results. Compare Le-
febvre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, 259 A.2d 133 (1969), and Sanner v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 488, 376 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (holding that insured did not incur any medical expense under insurance policy when
treatment was administered without charge by the Federal Government at military hospi-
tal), with Criterion Ins. Co. v. Starkes, 249 Md. 694, 241 A.2d 707 (1968), and Smith v.
United Services Automobile Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 672, 190 N.W.2d 873 (1971) (holding that
insured who received free government medical treatment did incur medical expenses under
insurance policy).
1983]
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the rule articulated in a Wisconsin decision, Smith v. United Services Auto-
mobile Association .36 In Smith the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned
that the medical benefits available to retired military personnel and depen-
dents are not gratuitous, but rather are an entitlement provided by Con-
gress and earned by performing a job in the armed forces.37 Following
this reasoning, the court of appeals held that the medical benefits Vail re-
ceived were not free of charge and, therefore, Vail in fact incurred medical
expenses under the terms of the policy.38. Because Vail had been required
to escrow the cost of the hospitalization medical expenses when he settled
with the tortfeasor and his insurer, he was entitled to reimbursement from
GEICO.39
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Deceptive Trade Practices. In McKnight v. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. ,40 a
diversity case, the federal district court followed several Texas cases in
holding that the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act4' does not create a
private cause of action for damages resulting from an insurer's unfair
acts,42 and that mere denial of an insurance claim is not a violation of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)43 or its counterpart in the
Texas Insurance Code, article 21.21. 4 McKnight obtained an insurance
policy from Ideal that protected against the direct loss of an aircraft. The
policy, however, excluded coverage for loss by conversion. In January
1980 McKnight leased the insured aircraft to Green, who flew it to South
America. Green never returned the plane, claiming that it had been con-
fiscated. Upon learning of the loss, McKnight filed a claim with Ideal.
The company ultimately denied liability, claiming that Green had con-
verted the aircraft, and that the conversion exclusion thus applied. Mc-
Knight then sued on the policy and, additionally, charged DTPA
violations. He alleged that during the investigation of the loss the insurer's
agent had informed him that Ideal was concerned about the possibility of
collusion between McKnight and Green and had assured him that Ideal
would pay the claim if McKnight would file theft charges against Green.
When McKnight filed the charges, Ideal denied the claim, citing Mc-
Knight's criminal theft complaint against Green as support for the denial.
McKnight charged that Ideal's action in encouraging him to file charges
against Green tricked him into providing a basis for denial of the claim
and was a violation of section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA and articles 21.21
and 21.21-2 of the Texas Insurance Code.
36. 52 Wis. 2d 672, 190 N.W.2d 873 (1971).
37. 190 N.W.2d at 874-75.
38. 623 S.W.2d at 172.
39. Id.
40. 534 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
41. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
42. 534 F. Supp. at 364.
43. Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
§ 17.41-.62 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
44. 534 F. Supp. at 364-65; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
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The district court granted the insurer's motion for partial summary
judgment on all statutory claims.45 The court first considered the plain-
tiffs claim that article 21.21-2, which sets forth various acts that consti-
tute unfair claim settlement practices by an insurer, creates a private cause
of action against an insurer.46 Although the plaintiff conceded that article
21.21-2 'does not authorize individual actions, he contended that section
17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA, which provides a private cause of action for vio-
lation of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, refers to article 21.21-
2 as well. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs claim, however, holding
that article 21.21-2 was intended only to authorize the State Insurance
Board to investigate and sanction unfair claim settlement practices, and
could not be read in conjunction with section 17.50(a)(4) to create a private
cause of action for such unfair practices.47
The court next turned to the plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to re-
cover under section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA and sections 4(1) and 4(2) of
article 21.21, which prohibit misinterpretations and false advertising about
insurance policies. The court noted, initially, that in order to recover
under these sections, the plaintiff would have to prove that the alleged con-
duct caused him damage.48 The court then held that neither the denial of
the claim nor the agent's alleged misstatement produced damage to the
plaintiff because he retained his right to sue upon the policy and to recover
his loss if the aircraft was found not to have been converted. 49
In American Insurance Co. v. Reed 50 the court of appeals similarly re-
jected an insured's attempt to recover treble damages because of an in-
surer's alleged wrongful denial of a claim.51 Reed purchased insurance
coverage for his truck under a group policy issued by Bellefonte Insurance
Company and allowed Nail to operate the truck for $500.00 per month.
While in Nail's possession, the truck was vandalized and damaged to the
extent of $8,585.25. The insurer denied liability for the loss, claiming that
because the truck had been leased to Nail, a conditional sale and bailment
lease exclusion in the policy applied.
Reed sued on both the policy and various statutory provisions, including
the DTPA, Texas Insurance Code article 21.21, and the rules the State
Board of Insurance promulgated under article 21.21, alleging that Belle-
fonte wrongfully denied his claim. The trial court rendered judgment for
Reed upon a jury verdict for $665,814.26, which represented three times
the sum of actual damages plus attorneys' fees. The damages included not
only the estimated repair cost, but also consequential and incidental dam-
45. 534 F. Supp. at 363.
46. Id. at 364-65.
47. Id. at 365.
48. Id. at 365. Section 17.50(a) requires that the alleged wrongful conduct "constitute a
producing cause of actual damages." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
49. 534 F. Supp. at 366.
50. 626 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
51. Id. at 906.
1983]
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ages for loss of use of the truck, storage, and past and future mental
anguish. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the
insurer on all claims except the claim on the policy, which was
remanded.5 2
The court rejected Reed's DTPA claim, holding that he had no standing
to sue under that Act.53 In order to recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff
must be a consumer,5 4 defined in the Act as a purchaser of goods or serv-
ices.55 When he obtained coverage in February 1977, Reed was not a con-
sumer under the DTPA because he had purchased the policy for
commercial use and, at that time, services for commercial use were ex-
cluded from the Act's scope. 56 Although the insurer denied the claim and
made certain other representations after the Act was amended to cover
commercial services, 57 the court held that Reed was not a consumer with
respect to these statements because they were not made in connection with
the purchase of goods or services.5 8
The court of appeals similarly rejected the plaintiffs other theories of
recovery. 9 The court stated that the claims based on violations of the
State Board of Insurance rules could not support a judgment because Reed
failed to introduce the rules into evidence. 60 The court refused to take
judicial notice of these rules, holding that they must be proved. 6' The
court further held, as a matter of law, that the insurer's failure to furnish a
copy of the group policy to Reed before the loss, or to inform him of the
conditional sale exclusion was not a violation of article 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code.62 Neither of those acts, stated the court, is defined as a decep-
tive act under article 17.46(b) of the DTPA, so as to be actionable
conduct. 63 The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the insurer's mere
denial of the claim does not give rise to liability for treble damages under
the DTPA or article 21.21, but merely forms the basis for plaintiffs claim
for enforcement of contractual rights under the policy.64
52. Id.
53. Id. at 902.
54. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) defines con-
sumer as "an individual, partnership, corporation, or governmental entity who seeks or ac-
quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."
56. In February 1977 when Reed's policy was issued, § 17.45(2) of the DTPA defined
"services" as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use,for other than business or
commercial use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."
1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 62, § 1, at 149 (emphasis added).
57. The Act now defines services to be "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for
use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
58. 626 S.W.2d at 902.
59. Id. at 902-05.




64. Id. at 905.
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Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Miller65 is a case of
first impression that involves the relationship between the DTPA and the
Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Pool Act.66 The plaintiff, Miller,
owned a condominium in Galveston that two companies insured under a
windstorm and hail policy issued through the statutory Texas Catastrophe
Property Insurance Association. The condominium was damaged during a
tropical storm, and Miller accordingly filed a claim with the association.
When the claim was denied, Miller sued the association and both insurers
in Harris County, asserting his policy claim and also DTPA violations.
The association filed a plea of privilege to be sued in Travis County. The
trial court concluded that Miller had established venue in Harris County
under article 17.56 of the DTPA67 and overruled the plea of privilege.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss
the suit as to the association, holding that the Harris County court lacked
jurisdiction.68 The court found the appeals procedure set forth in the
Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Pool Act to be controlling.69 The
Act, which created the Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association
in 1971, requires that each insurer authorized to sell property insurance in
Texas be a member of the association and underwrite policies in high risk
areas.70 The court found that the Act specified the procedure for appeal-
ing an "act, ruling, or decision of the association" 7' including a claim de-
nial. 72 A person aggrieved by the association's adverse decision may
appeal to the State Board of Insurance within thirty days after the deci-
sion.73 A person dissatisfied with a board decision may thereafter appeal
only to the district court of Travis County.74 Miller, however, had circum-
vented all of the procedural requisites by suing in Harris County. The
appellate court thus held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
entertain the lawsuit or the plea of privilege as to the association. 75
The Court also observed that the association could not be liable under
the DTPA for representations that the local recording agent who originally
took Miller's application for insurance may have made. 76 The association
is not responsible for the representations of a local agent because the asso-
ciation consists of all property insurers and does not have its own agents.77
The court also noted that mere denial of liability under an insurance pol-
icy would not give rise to liability under the DTPA.78
65. 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd).
66. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49 (Vernon 1981).
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
68. 625 S.W.2d at 345.
69. Id. at 346.
70. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49, §§ 1, 4, 6 (Vernon 1981).
71. Id.§9.
72. 625 S.W.2d at 346.
73. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49, § 9 (Vernon 1981).
74. Id.
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Nondiscoverability of Insurer's Claims File. In Maryland American General
Insurance Co. v. Blackmon79 the Texas Supreme Court decided a discov-
ery issue of paramount importance in litigation involving an insured's
claim that an insurance company has handled claims deceptively or in bad
faith. The suit arose from losses First State Bank of Bishop sustained that
had allegedly resulted from the bank president's dishonest activity. First
State Bank sought to recover the loss by collecting on its bankers' blanket
bond that Maryland American had issued and filed suit when the company
denied liability. The bank sought to recover compensatory and punitive
damages beyond the amount of the bond claim, alleging that Maryland
General had acted in bad faith by failing to properly investigate and pay
the claim.80
In connection with its bad faith claims the bank sought, through discov-
ery, all documents relating to the insurance company's investigation and
its decision not to pay the claim. The bank also requested that the insur-
ance company's attorney appear for deposition and produce all his files
relating to the disputed claim. The trial court.ordered the insurer to make
the requested discovery, overruling objections made on the basis of attor-
ney-client privilege.
The insurer applied to the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
to compel the trial judge to vacate his order, urging the applicability of the
work product privilege set out in rule 186a 8' and the attorney-client privi-
lege. The bank argued that the privilege did not apply to the bad faith
claims because the material sought constituted the operative facts forming
the basis of those claims. The court rejected this position, holding that the
privileges were fully applicable.8 2 Without determining the validity of the
plaintiff's bad faith allegations, the court held that the insurer could assert
the work product privilege so long as its liability on the bond remained
undetermined.8 3 The court noted that the attorney-client privilege exists
so long as a party's right to defend a suit exists and may continue even
after the termination of the original controversy or the attorney-client rela-
tionship.84 The court also recognized that disclosure of the information
requested by First State Bank would severely prejudice Maryland Gen-
eral's right to defend the action.85 Furthermore, the court concluded that
if a mere allegation of bad faith suffices to secure all of the insurer's inves-
tigative files, all suits against insurers would contain such allegations as a
matter of course.8 6
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage. Muller v. Allstate Insurance
79. 639 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
80. The bank also charged violations of the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code.
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.







Co.87 construed article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code, the unin-
sured or underinsured motorist statute.88 In that case a wrecker truck
struck and injured Muller's son. A company covered by a $10,000 per-
sonal injury liability owned the wrecker truck. An Allstate policy contain-
ing a $10,000 underinsured motorist provision covered Muller and his
family. Although Muller's medical expenses exceeded $275,000, he settled
his claim against the wrecker driver's liability carrier for its policy limit of
$10,000. Muller then sued Allstate for recovery under the $10,000 under-
insured motorist provision in his own policy, claiming that the $10,000
settlement he obtained from the wrecking company should be deducted
from the total $275,000 damages incurred. Allstate, on the other hand,
contended that article 5.06-1 and the policy required that the $10,000
settlement be deducted from the $10,000 underinsured coverage. The trial
court rendered summary judgment in favor of Allstate, and the appellate
court affirmed. 89
The court held that because the tortfeasor's liability coverage was equal
to Muller's underinsured motorist coverage, the tortfeasor's vehicle was
not underinsured within the definitions of the statute and the policy.90 Ac-
cordingly, the underinsured motorist coverage was wholly inapplicable
and unavailable to Muller. 9' As an alternative holding, the court noted
that Muller would be entitled to no recovery even if the statute was appli-
cable because the policy required reduction of the underinsured motorist
recovery by the amount recovered from the tortfeasor's liability carrier.
92
In Muller's case, deducting $10,000 from $10,000 would result in a net
recovery of zero.
In Montanye v. TransAmerica Insurance Co. ,93 another case involving an
uninsured motorist provision, the court reached a similar result.
Montanye, the plaintiff, was injured while riding as a passenger in von
Drak's automobile. Von Drak was covered by an insurance policy that
provided liability coverage of $10,000 per person and unin-
sured/underinsured coverage in the same amount. Montanye sustained
injuries with a stipulated value of $22,500, and she settled with von Drak's
liability carrier for $10,000. Montanye then sued the same carrier, von
87. 627 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
88. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06--4 (Vernon 1981). Specifically, the court interpreted
the provisions in article 5.06-1(2)(b) that define an underinsured motor vehicle as:
[Aln insured motor vehicle on which there is valid and collectable liability
insurance coverage with limits of liability for the owner or operator which
were originally lower than, or have been reduced by payment of claims arising
from the same accident to, an amount less than the limit of liability stated in
the underinsured coverage of the insured's policy. Id.
89. 627 S.W.2d at 777.
90. Id. at 776-77.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 777. The insurance contract itself stated that "[any amount payable under
the terms of this insurance. . . shall be reduced by. . . the amount recovered or recover-
able from the insurer of an underinsured motor vehicle." Id. at 776.
93. 638 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
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Drak's insurer, for the remainder of her damages under the unin-
sured/underinsured motorists endorsement to von Drak's policy.
The parties submitted the case on agreed facts to the trial court, which
rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the insurer. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the policy's clear and unequivocal language
specifically defeated recovery by Montanye. 94 The policy provided that
any amounts payable under the uninsured/underinsured coverage would
be reduced by sums paid under any applicable liability policy and by
amounts recovered or recoverable from the insurer of an underinsured
motor vehicle. The court, therefore, concluded that, under the clear lan-
guage of the policy, the $10,000 settlement Montanye received under the
liability portion of the policy should be subtracted from the $10,000 under-
insured motorist limit, leaving Montanye with no additional recovery. 95
In El-Habr v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. 96 the court deter-
mined the applicability of the 1977 statutory amendment to the unin-
sured/underinsured motorist provision of the Texas Insurance Code97 to
policies issued before the effective date of the amendment. Before the 1977
amendment the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute required that all
automobile policies contain uninsured motorist coverage for personal in-
jury, but not for property damage. 98 In 1977, however, the Texas Legisla-
ture amended article 5.06-1 to require that all automobile policies
contain uninsured motorist coverage for property damage as well as for
personal injury, unless the insured expressly rejected such coverage. 99
On July 19, 1977, before the effective date of the amendment, the plain-
tiff, El-Habr, purchased a Mountain States policy from an independent
agent. The policy provided liability coverage and uninsured motorist cov-
erage for bodily injury, but not for property damage. In March 1978 El-
Habr bought a van and informed his agent that he wanted the van "to be
covered." The agent added the vehicle to EI-Habr's policy by endorse-
ment, but failed to add uninsured motorist property damage coverage to
the existing policy. Furthermore, the agent never gave El-Habr an oppor-
tunity to reject the uninsured motorist coverage. Subsequently, El-Habr's
van collided with an uninsured motorist, destroying over $18,000 in prop-
erty El-Habr was transporting in the vehicle. El-Habr filed a claim with
Mountain States for recovery of the loss, but the company denied liability
because the policy provided no uninsured motorist property coverage.
The trial court granted a summary judgment for Mountain States, which
94. Id. at 520.
95. Id. In reaching its decision, the court relied upon American Gen. Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Oestreich, 617 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ), and Lick v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977) (both holding that the amount paid by the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier must be deducted from underinsured motorist coverage). 638
S.W.2d at 520-21.
96. 626 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981).
98. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 202, § 1, at 448.
99. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-I, § I (Vernon 1981).
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the court of appeals affirmed.' °° The court held that the March 1978 en-
dorsement that added the van to the policy became a part of the original
policy and did not create a new contract of insurance. 0 1 The agent and
Mountain States were, therefore, under no duty to El-Habr to provide him
automatically with uninsured motorist property damage coverage or to see
that he affirmatively rejected such coverage.' 0 2 To hold otherwise, stated
the court, would constitute a retroactive application of the statute.'
0 3
III. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Measure of Damages/or Partial Loss by Fire. In Imperial Insurance Co. v.
National Homes Acceptance Corp. 104 the court permitted recovery for fire
damage to a dwelling on the basis of repair cost, when neither party of-
fered evidence of the fair market value of the house before and after the
fire.' 0 5 The court also approved the form in which the trial court submit-
ted the issue of increased hazard.'°6 In this case Imperial Insurance Com-
pany provided a standard fire policy on the dwelling in 1974 and issued a
renewal policy for greater coverage effective February 7, 1977. A fire oc-
curred the day after the effective date of the renewal policy. Imperial de-
nied the insured's claim under the vacancy and increased hazard
provisions of the policy4 and the insured filed suit. The evidence at the
jury trial showed that the utilities had been disconnected in 1976 and that
a squatter had been living in the house shortly before the fire. The insured
presented evidence that the reasonable cost to repair the fire damage was
$9,930.43. Neither party offered evidence of the diminution in the fair
market value of the house. Based upon the jury's verdict, the trial court
rendered judgment for the insured in the amount of $9,930.43, and the
court of appeals affirmed 107
The court of appeals recognized that the usual measure of damages for
partial loss of a building is the difference between the value of the property
immediately before the fire and its value immediately after the fire.'0 8 The
court held that the policy provision specifying that the insurer's liability
should not exceed actual cash value or repair cost did not prescribe the
measure of damages but only limited the insurer's liability.' °9 Thus the
court allowed the insured to recover on the basis of repair cost because
neither party offered evidence of diminution in value, and the insurer
failed to object to the evidence of repair cost.' 'o
The court also approved the form of the trial court's submission of the




104. 626 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Id. at 331.
106. Id. at 332.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 329.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 330.
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increased hazard issue. The special issue, as submitted, asked the jury
whether an increase in hazard had occurred between the effective date of
the renewal policy and the date of the fire, and the jury answered in the
negative. The court rejected the insurer's contention that the issue should
have inquired whether the hazard had increased between the date of the
original policy and the loss date.' The court stated that the insurer had
no right to assume that the risk of loss under the renewal policy was identi-
cal to the risk of loss under the original policy because of the differences in
the terms of the original policy and the renewal policy. The court, there-
fore, held that the issue had properly inquired whether the hazard had
increased after the renewal date.' 2
Proof of Business Interruption Damages. In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Little
Joe's Cafsh Inn, Inc. 113 the insurer denied fire loss coverage, claiming
that the insured had committed arson, but the jury resolved the arson issue
in favor of the insured. The trial court awarded $11,400 in damages to the
insured for business interruption losses. The insurer successfully chal-
lenged the award on appeal.
The evidence showed that the insured had made no profit during the
months preceding the fire. The potential business interruption recovery,
therefore, was limited to actual rent and salary expenses for the period of
time required to repair or replace the property with due diligence and dis-
patch. The evidence indicated, however, that the insured had made no
rent or salary payments after the fire, although it had set up these items on
its books as accounts payable. The court further found that the insured
had no obligation to pay rent or salaries after the fire.' " 4 The insured ar-
gued that it would have paid the expenses but for the insurer's wrongful
refusal to pay the claim, but the court stated that liability for business in-
terruption loss did not arise in the absence of actual monetary loss."15
Thus, the court held that under the terms of the policy no basis existed for
the award of expenses that the insured never incurred.' 6
Scope of Coverage and Exclusions. In Blaylock v. American Guarantee Bank
Liability Insurance Co. "17 the court construed four exclusions in a standard
homeowners policy. Mrs. Blaylock sought payment under her homeown-
ers policy for damage that occurred when her swimming pool equipment
froze. On December 31, 1978, the City of Dallas suffered a freezing rain-
fall and the temperature reached twenty-three degrees Fahrenheit. Be-
cause the ice storm eliminated electrical service to her home, Mrs.
Blaylock spend the night at her son's house. When she returned the next
111. Id. at 332.
112. Id.
113. 636 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
114. Id. at 535.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 632 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1982).
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morning she discovered that the swimming pool circulation system had
frozen due to the failure of the circulating pumps to operate during the
power outage. Damage to the system amounted to $2,292.
The insurer denied liability on the basis of four specific exclusions in the
homeowners policy. The Texas Supreme Court construed each of the ex-
clusions in the insured's favor. The court first considered exclusion "e,"
which applied to "[1]oss caused by or resulting from freezing while the
building is unoccupied unless the Insured shall have exercised due dili-
gence with respect to maintaining heat in the building or unless plumbing,
heating and air-conditioning systems had been drained and the water sup-
ply shut off during such unoccupancy.""18 The court observed that the
exclusion by its terms applied only when the house was unoccupied." 9
The policy did not define the term "unoccupied," but the court stated that
the term's established meaning in insurance law referred to a place that is
not customarily used for human habitation. 120 The court held that Mrs.
Blaylock's temporary absence on the night of the power outage had not
rendered the house unoccupied within the meaning of the policy, and thus
the exlusion did not apply.121
The court next considered exclusion "k," which precluded recovery for
"[1Ioss. . . caused by settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion
of foundations, wall, floors, ceilings, roof structures, walks, drives, curbs,
fences, retaining walls or swimming pools."'1 22 The insurer argued that the
.xclusion applied because the loss resulted from expansion due to freezing
pipes. The court held the exclusion inapplicable, however, because it
clearly applied only to structural components, and the circulation system
motors were not structural components of the swimming pool or of the
house itself.' 23
Thirdly, the court construed exclusion "a," which applied to "[lI]oss to
electrical appliances, devices, or wiring caused by electricity, other than
lightning."' 24 The loss involved no power surge, but resulted instead from
a power failure. The court held that the phrase "caused by electricity" did
not encompass damage caused by lack of electricity, and, accordingly, the
court held the exclusion inapplicable to the loss.' 25
Finally, the court held that exclusion "i," which excluded coverage for
"[I]oss caused by. . . extremes of temperature," 26 did not apply. 27 The
term "extremes of temperature," the court indicated, refers to an unusual
or unexpected temperature. 28 The uncontroverted testimony of a meter-
118. Id. at 720.
119. Id. at 721.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 720.
123. Id. at 721-22.
124. Id. at 720.
125. Id. at 722.
126. Id. at 721.
127. Id. at 723.
128. Id. at 722-23.
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ologist established that a temperature of twenty-three degrees was within
the normal range of recurring temperatures for Dallas in late December.
The court, therefore, held that the damage did not result from an extreme
temperature, and thus the exclusion did not apply. 29
Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Newton130 involved the occu-
pancy condition to dwelling coverage in a homeowners policy and the ap-
plicability of the policy's limitations paragraph to a mortgagee's claim
under a homeowners policy. Five months before a fire damaged their
home, the Newtons moved to New Mexico temporarily to assist a relative
with his business. They removed some of their personal property from
their Dallas home and allowed Bright, a family friend, to occupy the
dwelling in their absence. Bright promised to make periodic mortgage
payments for the Newtons for two of the months of his absence, however,
Newton made the mortgage payments himself. Additionally, Mr. Newton
returned to his Dallas home on one occasion during Bright's occupancy.
Bright ultimately abandoned the insured dwelling, stealing some of the
Newtons' property, and on the following day the home caught fire. After
the fire Newton and his wife decided to reside permanently in New Mex-
ico. The Newtons and the mortgagee sued under the homeowners policy
for the fire damage to the dwelling.
Cambridge asserted as . defense that the Newtons were not occupying
the residence principally for dwelling purposes at the time of the fire.' 3'
The trial court did not submit the occupancy question to the jury. The
Newtons recovered a judgment in the trial court after a jury trial, and the
court of appeals affirmed the portion of the judgment awarding the New-
tons damages under the terms of the policy.' 32
The principal issues on appeal were whether Cambridge established
unoccupancy as a matter of law, and, if not, whether the occupancy issue
could properly be found in support of the judgment. Rejecting Cam-
bridge's contention that as a matter of law, the Newtons were not occupy-
ing the residence principally for dwelling purposes on the date of the loss,
the court distinguished two cases cited by Cambridge, Bryan v. United
States Fire Insurance Co. 133 and Fisher v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mutual
Insurance Co. ,134 from the case before it. Unlike the insured in Bryan, the
Newtons never declared that the insured house was a tenant dwelling and
never entered into a formal rental agreement with a third party. Bright
129. Id.
130. 638 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
131. The homeowners policy applied only to owner-occupied dwellings. It provided cov-
erage for the "[d]welling... while occupied by the Insured principally for dwelling pur-
poses." Id. at 78.
132. Id. at 82. The court reversed a portion of the judgment awarding damages for loss
of unscheduled personal property and expenses. Id.
133. 456 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recovery
denied when insured's tenant occupied insured dwelling at time of fire under month-to-
month rental agreement).
134. 456 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1972) (recovery denied when insured dwelling was undergo-
ing renovation and was uninhabitable at time of fire).
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functioned more as the caretaker of the insured dwelling than as the New-
tons' tenant. 35 The court also emphasized the Newtons' ability to occupy
the insured residence at will regardless of Bright's occupancy. 36 Further-
more, in contrast to Fisher, the Newtons had actually occupied the house
as their residence prior to moving to New Mexico. The court held, there-
fore, that the evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue with regard to
the occupancy question.' 37
The trial court announced before submitting the case to the jury that it
was granting Cambridge's motion for instructed verdict on the ground that
as a matter of law the Newtons were not occupying the house principally
for dwelling purposes at the time of the fire. The trial court did not render
judgment on the instructed verdict; rather it submitted a three-issue charge
to the jury. The jury found for the insured on all three issues, and the trial
court rendered judgment on the verdict. Cambridge urged on appeal that
the trial court erred in not submitting to the jury its requested special is-
sues on the occupancy question. The court of appeals noted that the rec-
ord failed to show that Cambridge ever obtained a ruling from the court
on its requested special issues, and thus that no reversible error was
shown.' 38 Since a fact issue existed regarding the occupancy question, but
the trial court did not submit the question to the jury, the court sought to
determine whether it must deem the occupancy question to support the
judgment. Because the record failed to disclose either a request for the
occupancy issue or an objection to its omission, or a request for a written
finding by the trial court on the omitted issue, the court concluded that it
must deem the trial court to have found the occupancy issue in such a
manner as to support the judgment. 139
In Cambridge the Newtons' mortgagee appealed the portion of the trial
court's judgment denying its claim against Cambridge for the unpaid bal-
ance of the mortgage debt. The trial court held the mortgagee's suit barred
by the policy's limitations provision. '40 The mortgagee contended that the
limitations clause did not bar its claim because the timely filing of the
Newtons' suit also tolled the limitations on the mortgagee's behalf. The
court stated, however, that while a mortgagee has an insurable interest in
the mortgaged property to the extent of the debt secured, its cause of action
is not derivative of the mortgagor's claim; thus, the mortgagee must assert
135. 638 S.W.2d at 79.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 80.
139. Id. at 80-81; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 279.
140. The limitations paragraph contained in the policy provided as follows:
Action Against The Company. No suit or action on this policy for the recov-
ery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all
the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, nor as respects
claim under:
Section I-Property Section: unless commenced within two years and one
day next after cause of action accrues . ...
638 S.W.2d at 81.
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its claim within the limitations period specified in the policy.' 4'
In Adrian Associates, General Contractors v. National Surety Corp. 142 the
court reached the remarkable conclusion that the phrase "water below the
surface of the ground" as used in a policy exclusion did not include water
from a artificial source, such as a ruptured underground water pipe. A
concrete slab that a contractor had laid in constructing a warehouse sub-
sided and settled into the ground when an underground water main rup-
ture created a cavern between the slab and the soil upon which it had been
poured. The contractor sued under its all risks policy for the amount re-
quired to tear out and reconstruct portions of the slab. The trial court
granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the
underground water exclusion and two other exclusions. On appeal the in-
surer abandoned its argument as to one of the exclusions, so that the ap-
pellate court's decision turned on its interpretation of the underground
water exclusion and the settlement of foundation exclusion.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the phrase in the policy
"water below the surface of the ground" was ambiguous. 143 Although the
insurer contended that the exclusion applied to all subsurface water
whatever the source, the court concluded that if the exclusion was intended
to apply to all water the insurer would have said so. 144 The court, there-
fore, applied the rule that ambiguities in insurance policies must be con-
strued in favor of the insured. 145 The court recognized that its holding
conflicted with the holding in Park v. Hanover Insurance Co. ,I46 an
Amarillo court of civil appeals decision, but supported its holding with an
Oregon case that construed a similar clause in favor of the insured. 47 The
court also concluded that the settlement of foundation exclusion did not
apply by reason of its holding regarding the underground water
exclusion. 48
Appraisal. Mays v. Foremost Insurance Co. 149 illustrates the importance of
141. Id. at 81-82.
142. 638 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Id. at 140.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, no writ). In Park the court stated
that damage to the foundation of a residence resulting from a ruptured underground water
line was clearly within an exclusion containing language identical to the language in Adrian
Associates. Id. at 941.
147. 638 S.W.2d at 139-40 (citing Hatley v. Truck Ins. Exch., 261 Or. 606, 495 P.2d 1196
(1972)). The court in Halley stated the following:
Subterranean waters are usually divided into two principal classes, namely:
(1) underground bodies or streams of water flowing in known and defined or
ascertainable channels or courses, and (2) waters which ooze, seep, or perco-
late through the earth, or which flow in unknown or undefined channels, gen-
erally referred to as "percolating waters."
495 P.2d at 1197 n.3 (quoting 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 102 (1947)). The court held that an
exclusion for water below the surface of the ground did not apply to water maliciously
sprayed against the insured's property. 495 P.2d at 1198.
148. 638 S.W.2d at 141.
149. 627 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
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adhering to policy provisions regarding proceedings to appraise the
amount of a loss fairly and impartially. While the insured was away on
vacation, his mobile home sustained water damage from leaky plumbing.
The insured filed a claim under his policy, but a dispute developed over
the amount of damages. The insurer demanded appraisal. In accordance
with the policy language, each party appointed an appraiser, and the court
appointed a third appraiser designated as the umpire. The umpire and the
insurer's appraiser rendered an appraisal in the amount of $923.93, and the
insurer tendered that amount, less the deductible, to the insured. The in-
sured rejected the tender and brought suit.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Affidavits
filed in the trial court reflected that the insurer's appraiser and the umpire
had excluded the insured's appraiser from some of their discussions. The
affidavits also indicated that the umpire had privately conferred and had
reached an agreement with a representative of the insurer, and that the
insurer's appraiser had a long standing business relationship with the in-
surer. The appellate court held that these affidavits raised fact issues as to
whether the parties carried out the appraisal provisions "fully, fairly and
without undue influence" by the insurer.' 50 The court therefore reversed
the summary judgment.15'
Rights of Lienholders. In Don Chapman Motor Sales, Inc. v. National Sav-
ings Insurance Co. 152 the court allowed a lienholder to recover for prop-
erty damage to a vehicle under an automobile policy's loss payable clause,
even though the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident was clearly
within a policy exclusion. The insured purchased a used Chevrolet from
Don Chapman Motor Sales, which financed the sale and retained a lien on
the Chevrolet. The insured obtained an insurance policy from National
covering both her interest and that of the lienholder. The insurer can-
celled the policy for nonpayment of premiums, subsequently reinstated the
policy, and then cancelled it again. The insurer did not notify the
lienholder of the second cancellation, and the cancellation was therefore
ineffective as to the lienholder. After the second cancellation the insured
permitted her son to drive the automobile, although the son did not have a
driver's license. The car was wrecked while the son was driving. The
lienholder subsequently repossessed the vehicle when the insured failed to
make timely payments, and, at that time, the lienholder discovered the
damage to the automobile. The lienholder sold the vehicle for salvage and
then made demand upon the insurer for the unpaid balance on the note.
The insurer denied coverage on the ground that the policy did not apply to
losses occurring "while the automobile is operated by ... any person
under the minimum age required to obtain a license to operate a private
passenger automobile."'' 53 The trial court agreed with the insurer's conten-
150. Id. at 234.
151. Id.
152. 626 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. Id. at 594.
19831
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tion and rendered judgment accordingly.
The court of appeals reversed on the basis of the loss payable clause in
the policy.' 54 The clause provided that as to the mortgagee's interest the
insurance would "not be invalidated by an act or neglect of the. . . mort-
gagor." 15 5 The court recognized that this was a "union mortgage clause"
rather than an open loss payable clause. A union mortgage clause creates
a new and independent contract between the insurer and the lienholder,
whereas an open loss payable clause subjects the lienholder to the defenses
that are available against the owner. 156 Under the clause in question,
therefore, the owner's acts or neglect did not defeat the lienholder's
rights. 157
The insurer argued that notwithstanding the union mortgage clause, the
policy did not cover the loss because an unlicensed driver was operating
the vehicle at the time of the loss, in violation of a specific exclusion. In
support of its argument the insurer cited US. Trust & Guaranty Co. v. West
Texas State Bank.158 The court in US Trust denied recovery to a
lienholder under a union mortgage clause because at the time of the loss
the owner was driving outside the United States, in violation of a policy
exclusion. 59 The court in Don Chapman Motor Sales declined to follow
US Trust, holding thatthe unlicensed driver exclusion did not defeat the
lienholder's rights.' 60 The court reasoned that the purpose of the union
mortgage clause was to protect the mortgagee's interest in property that it
did not possess or control, and that it would be inconsistent with that pur-
pose to deny recovery when the mortgagor by his act alone breached an
exclusionary provision.'61
In Helmer v. Texas Farmers Insurance Co. 162 the court held that an in-
surer was obligated to pay only $25.70 to a mortgagee on an outstanding
indebtedness of $6,725.70 when the mortgagee purchased the insured
property at a foreclosure sale for $6,700.163 Helmer and Hockert
purchased a house and sold it one week later to the Robertsons for $6,750,
retaining a vendor's lien. Texas Farmers issued a policy to the Robertsons
as named insureds and to Helmer and Hockert as mortgagees.164 The
154. Id. at 597.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 595.
157. Id. at 595-96.
158. 272 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ dism'd).
159. Id. at 629-30.
160. 626 S.W.2d at 597.
161. Id.
162. 632 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
163. Id. at 198.
164. The mortgagee clause provided:
This policy is in the interest of the mortgagee only therein, shall not be invali-
dated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described
property nor by any foreclosure or other proceedings relating to the selling of
the property, nor by any change of the title or ownership of the property, nor
by the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are per-
mitted by this policy; provided that the mortgagee shall notify this company of
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Robertsons became delinquent in their mortgage payments, and shortly
thereafter a fire of suspicious origin severely damaged the house. Helmer
and Hockert posted notice of a foreclosure sale and subsequently placed
the high bid of $6,700 at the sale. Thereafter, they attempted to collect
$6,725.70, the full amount of the indebtedness, from Texas Farmers.
Texas Farmers denied liability to the mortgagees beyond the $25.70 defi-
ciency. The insurer contended that the mortgagees' only interest in the
property was to secure payment of the mortgage debt, and that the pay-
ment of the $6,700 at the foreclosure sale extinguished all but $25.70 of the
debt, even though the payment came from the mortgagees themselves.
The trial court agreed with the insurer's arguments. It withdrew the case
from the jury and rendered judgment for the mortgagees in the amount of
the $25.70 deficiency. The court of appeals affirmed, observing that the
purpose of the mortgagee clause was to protect the mortgagee's security
interest in the mortgaged property.165 Because the purchase at the foreclo-
sure sale had satisfied the indebtedness, the insurer was not liable to the
mortgagees under the policy except for the $25.70 deficiency. 66
IV. HEALTH, LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
In Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Gunn 167 Raymond Gunn filed suit to
collect the proceeds of a group life insurance policy and a group accidental
death and disability policy upon the death of his wife, Phyllis Gunn. On
September 2, 1982, Phyllis Gunn interviewed for employment as a file
clerk with Fisher Scientific Company. She underwent a physical examina-
tion and executed a W4 Form, an Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance card,
and an employment contract with Fisher on September 3, but she did not
commence her duties as a file clerk until September 7. On December 5,
she was injured in an automobile accident, and she died on December 6.
The Aetna group policy in question provided that each employee would
become eligible for coverage on the date on which he or she completed
"three months of continuous service."' 68 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Aetna, finding that Mrs. Gunn did not complete three
months of continuous service prior to her death. The court of appeals re-
versed, however, and held that the term "three months of continuous serv-
ice" was ambiguous because the meaning of the word "service" was not
clearly ascertainable.' 69
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, finding that the
any change of ownership or increase of hazard which shall come to the knowl-
edge of said mortgagee.
1d. at 196.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 197-98.
167. 628 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1982).
168. Id. at 759.
169. Gunn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 629 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1981).
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policy was unambiguous. 70 The court stated that the rule for determining
whether a contract is ambiguous requires consideration of the contractual
language in light of the surrounding circumstances.' 7' If in light of the
surrounding circumstances the language of the contract appears to be ca-
pable of only a single meaning, the court can then confine its inquiry to the
four comers of the writing.' 72 In considering the circumstances surround-
ing Mrs. Gunn's commencement of employment, the court noted that Mrs.
Gunn executed the employment documents herself and inscribed on the
insurance form in her own hand that she would begin employment on Sep-
tember 7. Furthermore, the court found that she had not performed any
duties for Fisher prior to her first day of work. The court therefore held
that Mrs. Gunn commenced work on September 7, 1976 and, conse-
quently, that the policy did not cover her death, which occurred less than
three months from the day she commenced work.
173
American Diversified Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Texas State Board of
Insurance 174 involved the issue of the authority of the Texas State Board
of Insurance to disapprove for use in Texas a life insurance policy requir-
ing premiums and benefits to be paid in foreign currency. In 1978 Ameri-
can Diversified submitted to the board of insurance a policy form
specifying the payment of premiums and benefits in Swiss francs. The
commissioner disapproved the policy form, and the board of insurance
subsequently affirmed the commissioner's order pursuant to article 3.42(f)
of the Texas Insurance Code.175
The court of appeals found no specific provision in the Insurance Code
that authorized the issuance of a life insurance policy using foreign cur-
rency.' 76 Conversely, however, the court also determined that no provi-
sion expressly prohibited the issuance of a policy in a medium of exchange
other than dollars. 77 In fact, the court observed, the Insurance Code did
not explicitly authorize the standard U.S. currency policy.' 7 8 The court
noted, however, that article 3.01, section 1 of the Insurance Code defined a
life insurance company as "a corporation doing business under any charter
170. 628 S.W.2d at 759.
171. Id. at 760.
172. Id. (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981)).
173. 628 S.W.2d at 759.
174. 631 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
175. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.42(t) (Vernon 1981).
176. 631 S.W.2d at 807. The court noted that art. 3.42(f) limits the power of the board of
insurance to regulate forms used in the industry. Id. Article 3.42(f) provides:
The State Board of Insurance shall forthwith disapprove any such form, or
withdraw any previous approval thereto f, and only f,
(1) It is in any respect in violation of or does not comply with this Code.
(2) It contains provisions which encourage misrepresentation or are unjust,
unfair, inequitable, misleading, deceptive or contrary to law or to the public
policy of this State.
(3) It has any title, heading or other indication of its provisions which is
misleading.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.42(f) (Vernon 1981) (emphasis supplied).
177. 631 S.W.2d at 807.
178. Id. at 807-08.
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involving [a] payment of money or other thing of value, conditioned on the
continuance or succession [sic] of human life, or involving an insurance[,]
guaranty[,] contract or pledge for the payment of endowments or annui-
ties."' 79 On the basis of this definition, the court held that the Insurance
Code did not prohibit the issuance of life insurance policies denominated
in Swiss francs.' 80 To the contrary, the court stated that the phrase6money or other thing of value" appeared to authorize foreign currency
policies and to render such contracts fully enforceable.181
In McDonald v. McDonald182 a dispute arose over the rights to the pro-
ceeds of two life insurance policies. The controversy involved the dece-
dent's former wife, who was the named beneficiary, and the administrator
of the decedent's estate. The named beneficiary and the decedent were
divorced twenty-five days before the decedent's accidental death, and the
divorce decree awarded the life insurance policies to the decedent as his
separate property. The decedent neglected to designate a new beneficiary
prior to his death. The trial court nevertheless found that the former wife
was still the beneficiary, holding that the divorce decree had not divested
her of her contingent rights to the insurance proceeds.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the unmatured rights to the
insurance proceeds belonged to the community on the date of the di-
vorce.' 8 3 The divorce proceedings disclosed great animosity between the
parties, rendering it obvious that the decedent did not intend to give the
insurance proceeds to his wife. The court found sufficient evidence to re-
but the ordinary presumption that a decedent intends a gift to the named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy.' 8 4 The court therefore held that the
divorce decree had divested the former wife of her rights to the proceeds of
the policies. 185
Duty v. Ignasiak 186 involved a dispute over life insurance proceeds be-
tween the decedent's parents and his fiancee. The insured shot himself,
but before doing so he left a handwritten note in which he directed that the
insurance proceeds should go to his fiancde. 18 7 The policy provided that if
179. Id. at 808 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 3.01, § I (Vernon 1981) (emphasis
supplied)).
180. 631 S.W.2d at 808.
181. Id.
182. 632 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
183. Id. at 638-39.
184. Id. at 638.
185. Id. at 638-39; see also Brewer v. Brewer, 239 Ark. 614, 390 S.W.2d 630 (1965) (dece-
dent's divorced wife held divested of right to proceeds of decedent's life insurance policy
although named as beneficiary when wife, in divorce settlement agreement, released all in-
terest in policy); Romero v. Melendez, 83 N.M. 776, 498 P.2d 305 (1972) (award of insurance
policy to husband in divorce decree divested former wife of rights to proceeds although wife
remained named beneficiary); Dudley v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 250 Or. 5I, 440 P.2d 363
(1968) (divorce settlement agreement awarding life insurance policy to husband divested
wife of right to proceeds of policy although wife remained beneficiary).
186. 633 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
187. Id. at 655. The note stated, in part: "Vicki, you are my beneficiary and will bury
me. And someone make sure she gets my money out of my checking account and keeps the
money from my insurance." Id.
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no beneficiary had been designated, the insured's parents would be entitled
to the proceeds. 88
The court held that the beneficiary portion of the policy was an alternate
means of determining a beneficiary that was operative only if the insured
did not specifically designate a beneficiary. 8 9 Because the insured had not
designated a beneficiary prior to writing the note in question, his parents
would be the beneficiaries under the terms of the policy unless the suicide
note constituted a proper beneficiary designation. The court stated that
the general rule regarding a change of beneficiary is that the insured must
do all he reasonably can do to comply with the terms set out in his policy
for effecting such a change, and that the insured's intent in that regard is
irrelevant. 90 This rule does not apply, the court noted, when an original
designation of beneficiary is at issue. In such a case the insured's intent is
controlling, as it is in construing testamentary documents.' 9' In so hold-
ing, the court followed decisions from other jurisdictions. 92
Applying this rule, the court held that the insured had properly desig-
nated his fiancee as the beneficiary. 93 The policy required only that the
insured file a written request with the policy owner or at the insurer's home
office. The policy did not require that the designation be on an approved
form, be approved by the insurer, or be endorsed on the policy. The court
188. Id. The policy stated that the insured could:
designate a beneficiary or change his designation or [sic] beneficiary, from
time to time by written request filed with the Policyowner or at the Home
Office of the Company. Such designation or change shall take effect as of the
date of execution of such request, whether or not the Individual be living at
the time of such filing, but without prejudice to the Company on account of
any payments made by it before receipt of such request to its Home Office.
Id. The policy also provided as follows:
BENEFICIARY: The amount payable by reason of the death of an Individ-
ual shall be paid to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the Individ-
ual...
Except as may be otherwise specifically provided by the individual,
(b) if no designated beneficiary survives the Individual, or if no beneficiary
has been designated, payment shall be made to . . . the Individual's parents
Id. at 655-56.
189. Id. at 656.
190. Id.; see Kotch v. Kotch, 151 Tex. 471, 478-79, 251 S.W.2d 520, 524-25 (1952) (fail-
ure to comply substantially with policy provisions precluded effective change of beneficiary
despite insured's intent to make the change); Tips v. Security Life & Accident Co., 144 Tex.
461, 464, 191 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1945) (insured must comply substantially with method desig-
nated in policy for change of beneficiary); Adams v. Adams, 78 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd) (if insured does all that he reasonably could do to
comply with policy provisions for change of beneficiary, change is effective even if change
application arrives at insurer's home office after insured's death).
191. 633 S.W.2d at 656.
192. Id. (citing Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold, 38 Ill. App. 3d 658, 348 N.E.2d 520
(1976); Dennis v. Modem Bhd. of America, 119 Mo. App. 210, 95 S.W. 967 (1906)).
193. 633 S.W.2d at 657.
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held that the insured's note substantially complied with the policy require-
ments, and therefore, the note constituted a proper beneficiary designation
entitling the insured's fiancee to the policy proceeds.1
9 4
194. Id. at 656-57.
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